Fair Share Housing Allocation Plans: Which Formula Will Pacify the Contentious Suburbs? by Rose, Jerome G.
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 12
January 1976
Fair Share Housing Allocation Plans: Which
Formula Will Pacify the Contentious Suburbs?
Jerome G. Rose
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jerome G. Rose, Fair Share Housing Allocation Plans: Which Formula Will Pacify the Contentious Suburbs?, 12 Urb. L. Ann. 3 (1976)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol12/iss1/2
FAIR SHARE HOUSING ALLOCATION PLANS:
WHICH FORMULA WILL PACIFY THE
CONTENTIOUS SUBURBS?t
JEROME G. ROSE*
The decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Southern Bur-
lington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel' has focused the
attention of planners and land use lawyers throughout the country on the
complex problem of devising a plan by which the housing needs of a
region may be allocated to municipalities within that region. This prob-
lem is acute in New Jersey where the Mount Laureldecision held invalid
a municipal zoning ordinance because it failed to provide for the fair
share of the housing needs of the region of which the municipality was a
part. 2 The problem also exists in many other parts of the country where
legislative and administrative bodies have attempted to allocate to sub-
urban communities a fair share of the housing needs of a metropolitan
area.
3
t Copyright © 1977 by Jerome G. Rose. This article will appear in a book to be
published by Rutgers University Center for Urban Policy Research in 1977, SUBURBAN
HOUSING FOR THE POOR.
* Professor of Urban Planning and Chairman of the Department of Urban Planning,
Livingston College, Rutgers University. Editor-in-Chief, REAL ESrATE LAW JOURNAL.
B.A., Cornell University, 1948; J.D., Harvard University, 1951.
The author expresses his appreciation for the assistance of Douglas K. Wolfson, a
student at Rutgers Law School, in the preparation of this article.
1. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
2. Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724-25.
3. The following governmental and institutional bodies have either implemented or
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Some municipalities have responded with their own constructive
programs to provide for their fair share of regional housing needs.4
Other communities have resisted the effort of extra-municipal agencies
to intervene in what is perceived to be a local affair of local government.
To some municipalities, the imposition of a fair share allocation plan by
an outside agency threatens the character, the identity and the integrity
of the community. 5
It is very likely that much of the opposition to fair share allocation
plans is caused by the ambiguity and uncertain consequences of apply-
ing the formulae that have been devised for the computation of fair
share allocations. 6 During the past few years many fair share allocation
plans have been formulated. 7 Each is designed to achieve a particular
objective and each bases the allocation plan on a different set of stan-
dards.8 The misapplication of an allocation plan to a purpose for which it
was not intended can produce results that are not consistent with sound
plaming principles. In the selection or formulation of a housing alloca-
tion plan it is essential to consider the purpose for which the plan is
intended and the nature of the governmentalprocess by which it is to be
implemented. In addition, the criteria on which the allocation is based
proposed fair-share plans: Dade County Metropolitan Planning Board; Delaware
River Valley Regional Planning Commission; Fairfax County, Va.; The ,Greater
Hartford Process, Inc.; the State of Massachusetts; Metropolitan Washington Coun-
cil of Governments; Metropolitan Dade County Planning Department; Metropolitan
Council of the Twin Cities Area; Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission;
Middlesex County (N.J.) Planning Board; the State of New Jersey; New York State
Urban Development Corporation; Sacramento Regional Area Planning Commission;
and the San Bernardino County Planning Department. Others developing fair-share
mechanisms have included the University of Pennsylvania's Fels Center of Govern-
ment and the St. Louis Metropolitan Section of the American Institute of Planners.
Listokin, Fair-Share Housing Distribution: Will It Open the Suburbs to Apartment
Development?, 2 REAL ESTATE L.J. 739, 740-41 (1974) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter
cited as Listokin].
4. Id.
5. The "controlled growth" position may merely be a convenient justification by
suburban communities for retaining their exclusive nature. The popularity of such a
position poses a direct threat to fair share programs. See Finkler, Non-growth as a
Planning Alternative, ASPO REP. No. 283 (Sept., 1972).
6. For a review of the first year of post-Mount Laurel litigation see Rose, The Trickle
Before the Deluge from Mount Laurel, 5 REAL ESTATE L.J. 69 (1976).
7. For an excellent overview of the existing and implemented fair share plans see
Brooks, Lower-Income Housing: The Planner's Response, ASPO REP. No. 282 (July-
Aug., 1972) [hereinafter cited as Brooks]. See alsoListokin, supranote3, at743 (analyzes
the variations in the types of housing to be allocated).
8. Perhaps the most frequently mentioned standards used in determining fair share
housing allocations are grounded upon considerations of equality, need, distribution,
suitability, and the availability of jobs. See Brooks, supra note 7, at 20; Listokin, supra
note 3, at 743.
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should be selected to be consistent with the plan's purpose and adminis-
trative process.
I. THE PURPOSE OF THE FAIR SHARE ALLOCATION PLAN
The usual purpose of a fair share housing allocation plan is to promote
a greater choice of housing opportunities and to avoid undue concentra-
tion of low and moderate income persons in central cities or older
built-up suburbs.9 Congress has described this objective as one of the
express purposes of the housing assistance plan requirement of the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974.10 The 1974 Act also
describes the following as one of the objectives of that legislation:
the reduction of the isolation of income groups within communities
and geographical areas and the promotion of an increase in the
diversity and vitality of neighborhoods through the spatial decon-
centration of housing opportunities for persons of lower
income. .... I.
The housing allocation plans created in response to the Mount Laurel
decision should be designed to achieve the same purpose. 12 The New
Jersey supreme court made that purpose clear when it stated that every
developing municipality "must, by its land use regulations, presump-
tively make realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice of
housing. More specifically, presumptively, it cannot foreclose the
opportunity of the classes of people mentioned for low and moderate
income housing and in its regulations must affirmatively afford that
opportunity, at least to the extent of the municipality's fair share of the
present and prospective regional need therefor. ' ' 13 Thus it should be
clear that the purpose of a fair share housing allocation plan is to provide
an opportunity for low and moderate income families to escape from the
older central cities to the newer developing suburbs. 14 An allocation plan
that fails to achieve this objective or, even worse, serves to increase the
9. See Brooks, supra note 7; Listokin, supra note 3.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4) (1970).
II. Id. § 5301(c)(6).
12. See note 2 and accompanying text supra. The New Jersey supreme court cited
approvingly Listokin, Fair Share Housing Distribution: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come?, in INsTrruTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES, NEw JERSEY TRENDS 353 (1974). 67
N.J. at 190-91, 336 A.2d at 733-34.
13. 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724.
14. This may necessarily be predicated on the availability of land appropriate for
residential development. For an investigation of the characterization of a municipality as a
"developing municipality" see Rose & Levin, What is a 'Developing Municipality'within
the Meaning of the Mount Laurel Decision, 4 REAL ESTATE L.J. 359 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Rose & Levin].
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concentration of low and moderate income families in central cities or
older built-up suburbs, would be inconsistent with the objectives of both
the 1974 Act and the Mount Laurel decision.
II. THE NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS RESPONSIBLE FOR
IMPLEMENTING THE FAIR SHARE ALLOCATION PLAN
The allocation plans created for the implementation of the Housing
Assistance Plans of the 1974 Act as well as allocation plans designed for
implementation by an administrative agency can provide for a wide
range of opportunities for administrative discretion in their application.
Such plans are designed to determine the eligibility of government
applicants for federal funding or other benefits and anticipate the oppor-
tunity for negotiation and compromise in an on-going administrative
process. Housing plans for such a governmental process can be effec-
tive even though they are intricate, complex and even ambiguous.
A fair share housing allocation plan designed in response to the Mount
Laurel decision, to be implemented by a court, must be evaluated by
different criteria. 15 Such a plan should be created to help the court
determine whether the land use regulations adopted by the duly elected
legislative body of a municipality have so clearly denied an appropriate
variety and choice of housing that they violate the "general welfare"
principles of the state constitution.' 6 A fair share housing allocation plan
designed for the judicial process cannot assume an on-going administra-
15. In considering the remedies available in Mount Laurel, the court noted:
We are not at all sure what the trial judge had in mind as ultimate action with
reference to the approval of a plan for affirmative public action concerning the
satisfaction of indicated housing needs and the entry of a final order requiring
implementation thereof. Courts do not build housing nor do municipalities. That
function is performed by private builders, various kinds of associations, or, for public
housing, by special agencies created for that purpose at various levels of government.
The municipal function is initially to provide the opportunity through appropriate land
use regulations and we have spelled out what Mount Laurel must do in that regard. It
is not appropriate at this time, particularly in view of the advanced view of zoning law
as applied to housing laid down by this opinion, to deal with the matter of the further
extent of judicial power in the field or to exercise any such power.
67 N.J. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734.
16. The court based its decision on "the basic state constitutional requirements of
substantive due process and equal protection of the laws," id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 725,
rather than the express statutory requirement that zoning regulations promote the general
welfare. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-32 (1967). See note 43 infra. For an examination and
discussion of why the protections afforded by the state constitution were invoked as the
basis for the decision in the MountLaurel case see Rose, TheMount Laurel Decision: Is It
Based on Wishful Thinking?, 4 REAL ESTATE L.J. 61 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rose]. See
also Urban League v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Carteret, 142 N.J. Super. 11,359
A.2d 526 (Ch. 1976) (indicating that if a zoning ordinance is in derogation of the general
welfare encompassing housing needs, it will be struck down as unconstitutional).
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tive process of negotiation, compromise and adjustment between the
courts and the municipal governing bodies. The test of the utility of a
judicially implemented allocation plan is not whether it can achieve an
optimum condition of integration by a continuing and persistent
administrative process, but rather whether it provides a range of pos-
sibilities of housing choice that can be evaluated by a standard of
reasonableness. The state of the art of the planning profession is such
that a precise and exact formulation of the optimum range of housing
variety in a given community cannot be provided. A court should not be
misled by the purported exactitude of the print-outs of computer-
programmed housing allocation models.
III. ASSORTED CRrrERIA FOR HOUSINo ALLOCATION
A plan for the allocation of a "fair share" of low and moderate income
housing units to municipalities will adopt one or more criteria on the
basis of which the allocation will be made. There is no principle of
planning, logic or morality that makes any one criterion more correct
than any of the others. Each has its advantages, disadvantages and
professional proponents. The selection of one standard, rather than
another, can result in a very substantial difference in the number of units
to be "assigned" to a municipality and upon which the validity of its
zoning ordinance will depend. 7
For the purpose of illustrating the application of each of the following
criteria of fair share allocation, let us assume that the "region" has been
delineated and that the regional need for housing units for low and
moderate income persons has been postulated for a period of time.
A. Allocation Based Upon Need
This principle is designed to allocate housing units for low and moder-
ate income families to those municipalities having the greatest need for
such housing. This need may be measured by such factors as vacancy
rate, deterioration, overcrowding, and percentage of families paying
over 25% of their income for shelter. The difficulty with this critera is
17. If a court determines that a particular municipality has not, in fact, met its fair
share, then under the Mount Laurel holding, the zoning ordinance will be considered as
"presumptively contrary to the general welfare and outside the intended scope of the
zoning power." 67 N.J. at 185, 336 A.2d at 730.
In Urban League v. Mayor& Council of Borough of Carteret, the court responded to the
argument that a municipality might be exempted from Mount Laurel criteria if there
existed only minimal vacant acreage: "but a municipality is not exempt from the constitu-
tional standards of reasonableness in its zoning ordinance because it is not 'developing'
within Mt. Laurel." 142 N.J. Super. at -, 359 A.2d at 533.
19761
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
that it would allocate the greatest obligation for housing to urban areas
where there is the greatest overcrowding and deterioration. Thus, an
exclusionary suburban municipality within the region would have a
small allocation of housing units while a municipality more like a central
city or older built-up suburb would be assigned a larger share. Such an
allocation would not achieve the objectives of the Mount Laurel
decision.
To overcome this objection it would be necessary to base the alloca-
tion on future rather than existing housing need, on the assumption that
most future growth and housing need will be in the suburbs. To accom-
plish this, it is necessary to predict the housing need of the future for
each of the municipalities within the region. There are two commonly
accepted techniques for making this prediction: extrapolation and pre-
diction of future employment opportunities. The extrapolation tech-
nique is based upon the assumption that the trends indicated by census
and similar data will continue in the same direction and rate as previous
years. Thus if one of the municipalities had a population increase of 200
persons per year for the past five years it would be predicted that this
rate of increase will persist for the next five or ten years and a projection
of future population would be made on that assumption.
The next step in this process would be to ignore the same census data
relating to the socio-economic composition of the population by income
levels and assign a proportionate share of the regional need for housing
for low and moderate income families to that municipality. Thus even
though an exclusionary suburban community had been increasing in
population by 200 persons of upper income per year, the projection of
future population would assume a continuation of the same rate of
increase but would reject an assumption of the same socio-economic
composition. Population prediction by extrapolation is subject to criti-
cism for this reason and because it assumes a continuation of existing
population trends. This assumption has not been supported by the facts
of the past few years during which the rate of suburban growth in the
middle-Atlantic states has declined significantly. 18 It is presently
unclear whether the growth rate of suburban communities in the middle-
Atlantic states will resume. If such growth does resume, it is uncertain
what the rate of that growth will be.
Because of the inherent weakness of the extrapolation technique of
population prediction, some housing allocation formulas have adopted
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the "prediction of future employment opportunities" method of pre-
dicting the size and composition of future suburban populations. 19 This
method seeks to forecast future population characteristics based upon a
prediction of family income that may be derived from anticipated
changes in employment opportunities in the region. The future employ-
ment opportunities in turn are predicted on the basis of interviews and
surveys of representatives of industries that might reasonably be
expected to consider the region for future growth and expansion.
Thus it should be apparent that there are serious methodological
weaknesses in the techniques for predicting the size and composition of
future population. Consequently the computation of future housing
need based upon those predictions is similarly suspect.
B. Allocation Based Upon Economic and Racial Integration
This criterion is designed to allocate housing units for low and moder-
ate income families to those areas having the fewest low income and
racial minority families within their communities. If this standard is to
be used, it is important to direction attention to the similarities and
differences between economic integration and racial integration. There
is no question but that the denial of an opportunity for housing to any
person by a municipality on the grounds of race would violate our
federal Constitution2° and federal21 and state72 laws. However, the dis-
19. In Mount Laurel the court considered future employment opportunities to be an
important factor in terms of housing need. "Certainly, when a municipality zones for
industry and commerce for local tax benefit purposes, it without question must zone to
permit adequate housing within the means of the employees involved in such uses." 67
N.J. at 187, 336 A.2d at 732. Moreover, in discussing the determination of fair-share, and
the factors involved therein, the court indicated that "in arriving at such a determination
the type of information and estimates. . . concerning the housing needs of persons of low
and moderate income now or formerly residing in the township in substandard dwellings
and those presently employed or reasonably expected to be employed therein, will be
pertinent." Id. at 190, 336 A.2d at 733. See also Urban League v. Mayor & Council of
Borough of Carteret, 142 N.J. Super. 11, 359 A.2d 526 (Ch. 1976).
By the year 2000, the deficiencies in low and moderate income housing for industrial
employees within each municipality would be of disastrous proportions under present
zomng. . . .It is pertinent to note that at the present an estimated 75,000 residents of
the county are employed outside the county, as compared to an estimated 55,000
residents elsewhere who are employed within the county.
Id. at -, 359 A.2d at 535.
20. U.S. CONsT. amend. V, XIV.
21. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-05 (1970); cf. id. §§ 1981, 1983. Note particularly id. §
3604 which provides in pertinent part that "It shall be unlawful. . .(2) to refuse to sell or
rent. . . or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable
or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race. . .,"and id. § 3605, entitled "Discrimi-
nation in the Financing of Housing," which makes it unlawful to deny a loan or other
financial assistance to a person for the purpose of purchasing, constructing, repairing or
19761
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parity in housing facilities23 and other material advantages based upon
differences in wealth' has not usually been held to violate the law. The
Mount Laurel decision has been the most dramatic recent departure
from this otherwise well established principle of constitutional law. 2
The Mount Laurel decision does not, however, purport to address the
issue of racial discrimination directly.26 The court made this distinction
clear at the beginning of the opinion:
We will, therefore, consider the case from the wider viewpoint
that the effect of Mount Laurel's land use regulation has been to
prevent various categories of persons from living in the township
because of the limited extent of their income and resources. In this
connection, we accept the representation of the municipality's
maintaining a dwelling. See generally United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474
F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973); Sanborn v. Wagner, 354 F. Supp. 291
(D. Md. 1973); United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss.
1972); Williamson v. Hampton Management Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. I1. 1972);
United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969).
22. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12g-i (Supp. 1976) which proscribes discriminatory
practices in the sale or rental of dwellings. The statute is patterned after the federal Fair
Housing Act, and uses substantially the same language. See note 21 supra.
23. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), where California's referendum
approval requirement of low-rent public housing projects was held constitutionally sound,
implying that the right to adequate shelter (where the shelter can be denied by a vote of the
people of the state) is not a fundamental right. See also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972).
The Court in Lindsey considered a constitutional challenge by tenants of the Oregon
forcible entry and detainer statute, which provided summary eviction procedures upon
nonpayment of rent and did not allow a defense of uninhabitability. In rejecting plaintiff's
equal protection argument, the Court said:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, sanitary housing. But the
Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We
are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of access to
dwellings of a particular quality. . . .Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance
of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative,
not judicial, functions.
Id. at 74.
24. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (wealth
held not to be a suspect classification in the area of school funding). In Rodriguez, the
Court explained its conclusion as follows:
We perceive no justification for such a severe denigration of legal property taxation
and control as would follow from appellees' contentions. It has simply never been
within the constitutional prerogative of this court to nullify statewide measures for
financing public services merely because the burdens or benefits thereoffall unevenly
depending upon the relative wealth of the political subdivisions in which citizens llve.
Id. at 54 (emphasis added). But see Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 601 (1971). See also Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473,303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414
U.S. 976 (1973).
25. It should be noted, however, that the Mount Laurelcourt expressly disavowed any
reliance on federal constitutional principles. 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 725. See also note
16 and accompanying text supra.
26. 67 N.J. at 159, 336 A.2d at 717.
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counsel at oral argument that the regulatory scheme was not
adopted with any desire or intent to exclude prospective residents
on the obviousl illegal basis of race, origin or believed social
incompatibility."
There is little question, however, that the court was well aware of the
fact that discrimination against the poor usually falls most heavily upon
racial and ethnic minorities.' Nevertheless, the Mount Laureldecision
does not purport to provide a remedy for racial discrimination directly.29
The decision prescribes a remedy directed specifically to the problem of
economic discrimination in the suburbs. A fair share housing allocation
plan adopted to comply with the Mount Laurel principles should simi-
larly be directed specifically to the problem of economic discrimination
in the suburbs. 30
27. Id. (emphasis added). See also Urban League v. Mayor & Council of Borough of
Carteret, 142 N.J. Super. 11, -, 359 A.2d 526, 530 (Ch. 1976) where the court similarly
dismissed claims of wilfull racial discrimination and proceeded to address the exclusion-
ary aspects of the defendants' zoning ordinances.
28. 67 N.J. at 159, 336 A.2d at 717. See also Urban League v. Mayor & Council of
Borough of Carteret, 142 N.J. Super. 11, -, 359 A.2d 526, 530 (Ch. 1976) ("the impact of
low density zoning is most adverse to blacks and Hispanics, who are disproportionately of
low and moderate income").
29. 67 N.J. at 159, 336 A.2d at 717. As an appropriate remedy, the court suggested:
"We have in mind that there is at least a moral obligation in a municipality to establish a
local housing agency pursuant to state law to provide housing for its resident poor now
living in dilapidated, unhealthy quarters." Id. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734.
In concurrence Justice Pashman forcefully stated:
The problems we begin to face today are of awesome magnitude and importance,
both for New Jersey and for the nation as a whole. It will not do to approach them
gingerly; they call out for forceful and decisive judicial action.
.. .The question is whether the suburbs will act to accommodate this growth in an
orderly way or will simply and blindly resist.
.. .The shape of the possible disaster can now be foreseen. The inevitable
alternative to assumption by suburban communities of an obligation to provide for
their fair share of regional housing needs is an increase in the size of slums with all
their attendant miseries. The consequences of such economic, social, and racial
segregation are too familiar to need recital here. .. .Justice must be blind to both
race and income.
L . I ike animal species that overspecialize and breed out diversity and so perish
in the course of evolution, communities, too, need racial, cultural, social and
economic diversity to cope with our rapidly changing times.
Id. at 220-21, 336 A.2d at 749.50 (Pashman, J., concurring). See also Urban League v.
Mayor & Council of Borough of Carteret, 142 N.J. Super. 11, -, 359 A.2d 526, 530 (Ch.
1976) ("[N]o credible evidence of deliberate or systematic exclusion of minorities was
before the court").
30. 67 N.J. at 159, 336 A.2d at 717. See Urban League v. Mayor & Council of Borough
of Carteret, 142 N.J. Super. 11, -, 359 A.2d 526, 541 (Ch. 1976), where the court
determined that the first fair share allocation would be to "correct the present imbalance,
that is to bring each defendant municipality up to the county proportion of 15% low and
19% moderate income population."
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The use of this standard to formulate a fair share housing allocation
plan is comparatively easy. Census data will disclose the income of the
residents of each of the municipalities within the designated region. The
proportion of low and moderate income residents in each municipality
can be calculated and an allocation of low and moderate income housing
would be made in inverse proportion to existing proportions. Thus, a
municipality that has very few low and moderate income residents
would have a large share of low and moderate income housing units
assigned to it while another municipality that already has a very large
proportion of low and moderate income residents would receive a small
allocation. Such an allocation system would achieve directly the Mount
Laurel objective of economic integration in the suburbs 31 and would
foster indirectly the additional benefit of racial integration. On the other
hand, the allocation of any significant number of low and moderate
income housing units to central cities, older built-up suburbs or to
municipalities with existing large amounts of low and moderate income
housing would subvert the purpose of the Mount Laurel decision. 32
C. Allocation Based On the Premise That an Equal
Share is a Fair Share
Under the equal share formula each municipality would receive an
allocation of an equal share of the regional housing need, regardless of
size, population or other significant characteristics. This principle of
allocation is based upon the misconceived premise that "equality" can
be equated with "fairness." From the perspective of a planner, this
principle makes little sense because the planning process should be
designed to formulate rational plans and programs that are custom-made
to meet the specific needs of and to utilize the available resources of a
particular community. An allocation system that ignores real and sub-
stantial differences among municipalities must be characterized as
"arbitrary and irrational" rather than "fair.1 33 In addition, such a
31. 67 N.J. at 159, 336 A.2d at 717.
32. Id. at 160, 336 A.2d at 717. For a discussion of how the Mount Laurelprinciples are
applicable to a municipality which is located outside the central cities and older built-up
suburbs see Rose & Levin, supra note 14, at 370-71.
33. The court in Mount Laurel apparently recognized the need to direct a certain
amount of attention to the differences between municipalities, as evidenced by its limita-
tion of the Mount Laurel mandate to those municipalities which can appropriately be
characterized as "developing." Justice Hall used the phrases "developing municipality
like Mount Laurel," "such municipalities," and the like, a total of fifteen times. See 67
N.J. at 160, 173, 174, 179, 180, 185, 186, 187, 188, 190, 191, 336 A.2d at 717, 724, 727, 728,
731, 732, 733. But see id. at 194, 336 A.2d at 735 (Pashman, J., concurring). Justice
Pashman voiced dissatisfaction with the restrictive approach taken by the majority:
[Vol. 12:3
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol12/iss1/2
FAIR SHARE ALLOCATION PLANS
system would be oblivious to the underlying purpose of the Mount
Laurel decision, to avoid undue concentrations of low and moderate
income persons in central cities and older built-up suburbs. 34
D. Allocation Based on Population Proportions
The use of this criterion would allocate a share of the regional need for
low and moderate income housing units to each of the municipalities
within the region based upon the proportion of population of each
municipality to the total population of the region. This technique is only
one step removed from the oversimplistic principle of "equal share."
The population proportion technique is an improvement over the equal
share technique because it begins to recognize that there are differences
among municipalities within a region and that those differences are
relevant in a rational system of allocation of low and moderate income
housing units. 35 The improvement is insufficient, however, because
only one of the many relevant factors that differentiate municipalities is
The majority has chosen not to. . . consider the degree to which the principles
applicable to developing municipalities are also applicable to rural ones and to largely
developed ones. . . [E]xclusionary zoning is aproblem of such magnitude and depth
as to require that the Court extend these principles to all municipalities in the State
Id. at 208, 336 A.2d at 743. See also Urban League v. Mayor & Council of Borough of
Carteret, 142 N.J. Super. 11, -_, 359 A.2d 526, 537-41 (Ch. 1976) (the court painstakingly
described the existent condition as to each defendant municipality); Rose & Levin, supra
note 14, at 369-81.
The Mount Laurel court was also aware of possible environmental and ecological
problems which might be relevant:
The present environmental situation in the area is. . . no sufficient excuse in itself
for limiting housing therein to single-family dwellings on large lots. . . . This is not to
say that land use regulations should not take due account of ecological or environmen-
tal factors or problems. Quite the contrary. Their importance, at last being recog-
nized, should always be considered.
67 N.J. at 186, 336 A.2d at 731.
34. 67 N.J. at 159, 336 A.2d at 717. But see Urban League v. Mayor & Council of
Borough of Carteret, 142 N.J. 11, -_, 359 A.2d 526,541-42 (Ch. 1976) wherethe projected
need of housing was allocated to each of the defendant municipalities equally. In support
of this determination, the court stated:
Subtracting 4,030 from the 18,697 low and moderate income housing units needed
in the county to 1985, the balance is 14,667 or approximately 1,333 per municipality.
There is no basis not to apportion these units equally. Each municipality has vacant
suitable land far in excess of its fair share requirement without impairing the estab-
lished residential character of neighborhoods. Land to be protected for environmen-
tal considerations has been subtracted from vacant acreage totals. No special factors,
such as relative access to employment, justifies [sic] a deviation from an allocation of
1,333 low and moderate housing units, plus the allocation to correct the imbalance, to
each of the I I municipalities.
Id.
35. See note 34 supra.
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considered. 36 The allocation of low and moderate income housing would
be based exclusively upon the total population. This standard is a gross
measure of the difference among municipalities when the objective is to
avoid undue concentration of low and moderate income persons in
central cities or older built-up suburbs. The use of this standard would
contravene the purpose of the Mount Laureldecision because it would
allocate the greatest share to the most populous central cities and would
allocate the smallest share to the most exclusionary suburbs.
E. Allocation Based Upon Proportion of Existing Jobs
The use of this criterion would allocate a share of the regional need for
low and moderate income housing to each municipality within the region
based upon the relationship of the number of jobs within each munici-
pality to the total number of jobs within the region. This technique is
appealing because it begins to address the issue of the suitability of the
municipality to accommodate the low and moderate income families for
whom the housing is allocated. In addition, the information upon which
the allocation is made is readily available and is not based upon indefi-
nite or conjectural assumptions. This allocation technique also responds
well to a test of fairness because it would impose the greatest obligation
on those municipalities that reap the advantage of tax revenues from the
industrial enterprises that now provide the jobs and that would provide
suburban jobs to city residents. 37 This standard is appealing to planners
who seek to conserve human and natural resources by reducing the
amount of time and energy required for the daily trip from residence to
place of employment and to the judiciary seeking to implement the
Mount Laureldecision with a comparatively simple and easily adminis-
tered principle.
The primary disadvantage of this criterion is that its application would
result in the allocation of few low and moderate housing units to the
most exclusionary residential suburbs with few jobs and would fre-
quently impose the greatest obligation upon those communities that
have already assumed the greatest share of such housing. In addition the
adoption of this system of allocation would permit "exclusionary-
minded" municipalities to avoid further allocations of low and moderate
36. For an example of other factors that distinguish municipalities from each other see
Rose & Levin, supra note 14, at 369-81.
37. This technique is also consistent with Mount Laurel principles. 67 N.J. at 187, 336
A.2d at 732: "Certainly when a municipality zones for industry and commerce for local
tax benefit purposes, it without question must zone to permit adequate housing within the
means of the employees involved in such uses."
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cost housing by discouraging industrial and commercial development. 38
F. Allocation Based Upon Proportion of Future Jobs
This technique was designed to retain the advantages of the existing-
jobs allocation formula and eliminate its disadvantages. It would
achieve neither purpose. By allocating a share of the regional need for
low and moderate income housing to each municipality based upon the
proportion of future rather than existing jobs, the allocation becomes
dependent upon indefinite and conjectural assumptions; obligations are
imposed without regard to the actual municipal revenue; and there is no
assurance that the jobs will ever materialize in fact.39 The supposed
advantage of this technique is that it would permit the allocation of a
share of housing to "exclusionary" suburbs that offer only expensive
housing and no job opportunities. It would also permit allocation of
housing to other suburbs that discourage residential development by
zoning large tracts of land for industrial use even though the likelihood
of any such industrial use in the foreseeable future is slight.
The weakness of this technique derives from the need to predict the
38. Such a policy might not be in the best fiscal interests of the particular municipality.
The existing policy of land use regulation for a fiscal end derives from New Jersey's tax
structure. What occurs in a typical municipality is that:
Sizeable industrial and commercial ratables are eagerly sought and homes and the lots
on which they are situated are required to be large enough, through minimum lot sizes
and minimum floor areas, to have substantial value in order to produce greater tax
revenues to meet school costs. Large families who cannot afford to buy large houses
and must live in cheaper rental accommodations are definitely not wanted, so we find
drastic bedroom restrictions for, or complete prohibition of, multi-family or other
feasible housing for those of lesser income.
67 N.J. at 171, 336 A.2d at 723. The court also pointed out the inadequacies of such a
practice:
One incongruous result is the picture of developing municipalities rendering it
impossible for lower paid employees of industries they have eagerly sought and
welcomed with open arms (and, in Mount Laurel's case, even some of its own lower
paid municipal employees) to live in the community where they work.
Id. at 172, 336 A.2d at 723.
39. If no jobs do in fact materialize, the lower income or unskilled employee may not
be able to find work at all. The court in Mount Laurel was astutely aware of the potential
problems in such a situation:
In a society which came to depend more and more on expensive individual motor
vehicle transportation for all purposes, low income employees very frequently could
not afford to reach outlying places of suitable employment and they certainly could
not afford the permissible housing near such locations. These people have great
difficulty in obtaining work and have been forced to remain in housing which is
overcrowded, and has become more and more substandard and less and less tax
productive. There has been a consequent critical erosion of the city tax base and
inability to provide the amount and quality of those governmental services-
education, health, police, fire, housing and the like-so necessary to the very exist-
ence of safe and decent city life.
Id. at 172-73, 336 A.2d at 724.
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future or to rely upon the prediction made by each municipality con-
tained in the allocation of land zoned for industrial use. Since the
allocation of housing would be based upon the relationship between the
number of acres of land in each municipality zoned for industrial and/or
commercial use and the total number of acres zoned for such use in the
designated region, a municipality that has no industry or commerce to
provide jobs for low and moderate income persons and has no revenue
to support the costs associated with such housing would nevertheless
receive a substantial housing allocation if the zoning ordinance of the
municipality contains a substantial amount of vacant land zoned for
industrial and/or commercial use. The difficulty with this technique is
that the obligations of a municipality can easily be avoided by reducing
or eliminating the amount of land zoned for industrial and/or commerce
use .4
G. Allocation Based Upon Suitability of the Municipality
For Low and Moderate Income Housing
If a fair-share housing allocation plan must comply with principles of
rational and comprehensive planning then the suitability of the munici-
pality for low and moderate income housing should be the criterion upon
which that allocation plan is based.41 In fact, it would require a judgment
bordering upon professional irresponsibility to propose that housing for
low and moderate income families should be allocated to an area where
there are few jobs, no public transportation, insufficient educational,
medical and social services, inadequate water and sewer facilities and
inordinate ecological risks. These and other factors, including the fiscal
capacity of the municipality to provide the requisite services and the
allocation of land within the jurisdiction, are among the many factors
considered and evaluated in the planning process. 42
40. It should be noted, however, that the court in Mount Laurelmay have had precisely
this result in mind-i.e., breaking up the usual municipal practice of zoning an excess
amount of vacant land for industrial and commercial uses. See id. at 163, 336 A.2d at 718.
See also note 39 supra.
41. See Listokin, supra note 3, at 746, 754-55 (Massachusetts fair share plan guided by
suitability considerations).
42. The fiscal capacity of a municipality is an appropriate factor to be considered in
determining whether that municipality is a suitable place for housing, except when fiscal
factors are considered for the purpose of excluding certain categories of housing. See
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 185-86,
336 A.2d 713, 731, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975):
We have previously held that a developing municipality may property zone for and
seek industrial ratables to create a better balance for the community vis-a-vis educa-
tional and governmental costs engendered by residential development, provided that
such was " . . . done reasonably as part of and in furtherance of a legitimate
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The critical issue that must be comprehended by the judiciary and
other intervenors in the planning process is that there is no objective
method of weighing each of the many factors of "suitability." It is
precisely for this reason that, after the planning studies are made and
professional opinions are offered, the planning process must be con-
tinued in a forum comprised of elected representatives with a demo-
cratic and constitutional mandate to make policy decisions. 43 This
creates a difficult dilemma for a court seeking to implement the Mount
Laurel decision by a judicial determination of the "fair share" obliga-
tion of a municipality. If an easy-to-apply allocation formula (such as
number of jobs) is adopted, the allocation will be made without regard to
the many other critical principles and practices of the planning process.
Such an allocation would be vulnerable to attack as an arrogant disre-
gard of the integrity and purpose of the planning process.44 On the other
hand, if the allocation formula considers the many factors involved in
comprehensive plan for the zoning of the entire municipality." Gruber v. Mayor &
Township Comm. of Raritan Township, 39 N.J. 1, 9-11 (1962). We adhere to that view
today. But we were not there concerned with, and did not pass upon, the validity of
municipal exclusion by zoning of types of housing and kinds of people for the same
local financial end. We have no hesitancy in now saying, and do so emphatically, that,
considering the basic importance of the opportunity for appropriate housing for all
classes of our citizenry, no municipality may exclude or limit categories of housing
for that reason or purpose. While we fully recognize the increasingly heavy burden of
local taxes for municipal governmental and school costs on homeowners, relief from
the consequences of this tax system will have to be furnished by other branches of
government. It cannot legitimately be accomplished by restricting types of housing
through the zoning process in developing municipalities.
43. Compare 67 N.J. at 194,336 A.2d at 735 (Mountain, J., concurring) (agreeing with
the majority, but basing his conclusion on his interpretation of the term "general welfare"
as it appears in N.J. STAT. AN. § 40:55-32 (1967): "[zoning] regulations shall be in
accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed for one or more of the following
purposes: to. . .promote. . .the general welfare .. "), with id. at 151,336A.2d713
(Hall, J., majority opinion). One significant difference between the two opinions rests on
the availability of legislative review. Justice Mountain would have permitted the state
legislature, as opposed to the judiciary, to effectively change the interpretation of "gen-
eral welfare" through the legislative process. Justice Hall, on the other hand, would find
this result nearly impossible in that the conclusions are grounded on inherent due process
and equal protection clauses of the state constitution. See Rose, supra note 16.
44. The then-effective New Jersey municipal zoning enabling legislation provided:
Such regulation shall be in accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed for
one or more of the following purposes:
Such regulation shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things,
to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a
view of conserving the value of property and encouraging the most appropriate use of
land throughout such municipality.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-32 (1967) (repealed effective Aug. 1, 1976). See Rockhill v.
Chesterfield Twp., 23 N.J. 117, 128 A.2d 473 (1957) (where the court held that zoning
regulations had to be in accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed to serve the
public welfare); see also Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 43,288 N.Y.S.2d 888,235 N.E.2d 897
(1968).
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the "suitability" of each municipality, then the judgment of the court on
these issues would be vulnerable to attack as an unwarranted intrusion
into the legislative process. 45 It is questionable whether a court can
avoid this dilemma by appointing a professional planner to formulate the
housing allocation plan. Such an appointed expert could bring to the
process nothing more than professional competence and seasoned judg-
ment. The professional planner would have no special ability or man-
date to make the policy decisions upon which any allocation plan must
eventually rest. This observation may disclose the weakest assumption
upon which fair share allocation plans and the Mount Laurel principle
are based.
H. Allocation Based Upon the Obligation of Every Municipality
To Take Care of the Housing Needs of Its Own Constituents
This method of allocation is designed to meet local municipal housing
needs rather than regional housing needs. Consequently it does not
purport to comply with the theory of the Mount Laurel decision. Its
primary advantage, however, is that it may be capable of achieving the
objectives of the Mount Laurel decision more readily than allocation
formulas designed to achieve more idealistic but politically assailable
regional housing needs. The objective of the Mount Laureldecision can
be achieved only if a variety and choice of housing is made available in
most, if not all, of the municipalities within the state. 6 As a practical
matter, this means that apartments, townhouses and aggregated, higher-
density dwelling unit construction must be permitted under municipal
law. 47 If all municipal governing bodies willinglypermit a limited amount
of such construction, there is reason to predict that more housing will be
built in this voluntary way than will ever be built as a result of a judicially
45. See N.J. CONST. art. 3, par. 1. See also Maule v. Conduit & Foundation Corp., 124
N.J. Super. 488,307 A.2d 651 (L. Div. 1973); West Morris Regional Bd. of Educ. v. Sills,
110 N.J. Super. 234,265 A.2d 162 (Ch. 1970); cf. Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351,307A.2d 571
(1973), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1106 (1973).
46. See 67 N.J. at 187, 336 A.2d at 731-32:
As a developing municipality, Mount Laurel must, by its land use regulations, make
realistically possible the opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing
for all categories of people who may desire to live there, of course including those of
low and moderate income.
47. As to this practical effect, the court in Mount Laurel noted that a developing
municipality like Mount Laurel
. must permit multi-family housing, without bedroom or similar restrictions, as
well as small dwellings on very small lots, low cost housing of other types and, in
general, high density zoning, without artificial and unjustifiable minimum require-
ments as to lot size, building size and the like, to meet the full panoply of these needs.
Id. at 187, 336 A.2d at 732.
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mandated and politically resisted fair share housing allocation plan.
The purpose of a "take-care-of-our-own" allocation plan is to pro-
pose a formula that is more acceptable politically to the constituents of
municipalities to whom the state constitution has granted the power of
home rule." This plan rests upon the assumption that most fair-minded
people recognize a need to provide housing for themselves, when they
become elderly, for their children, for the policeman, fireman, teachers
and other municipal employees who provide essential government ser-
vices, and even to those who work within the community or who have
recently left because of an inability to find satisfactory housing within
their means. All judicially proclaimed ideals to the contrary notwith-
standing, local opposition to apartments and less expensive housing
becomes manifest only when it is possible for local residents to conjure
up the threat of invasion of hordes of outsiders whose numbers and
presence may threaten the safety, security and amenities of the com-
munity they seek to preserve. There is no need to call forth such images
to correct the inequities of restrictive zoning ordinances. There is no
need to arouse the fears or to deny the legitimate concerns of suburban
residents. 49 There is no need to pit the powers of the courts against the
prerogatives of the legislature.
48. See N.J. CONST. art. 4, § 6, par. 2:
2. The Legislature may enact general laws under which municipalities. . . may
adopt zoning ordinances limiting and restricting . . . buildings and structures,
according to their construction, and the nature and extent of their use, and the nature
and extent of the uses of land, and the exercise of such authority shall be deemed
within the police power ...
Pursuant to this constitutional provision, there is a strong presumption in favor of validity
of a zoning ordinance. See, e.g., Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J.
241,281 A.2d 513 (1971); Harvard Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 56 N.J. 362,
266 A.2d 588 (1970); Bogart v. Washington Twp., 25 N.J. 57, 135 A.2d 1 (1957); Molino v.
Mayor & Council of Glassboro, 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (L. Div. 1971).
49. In addressing these fears and images the Mount Laurel court stated:
There is no reason why developing municipalities like Mount Laurel, required by
this opinion to afford the opportunity for all types of housing to meet the needs of
various categories of people, may not become and remain attractive, viable com-
munities providing good living and adequate services for all their residents in the kind
of atmosphere which a democracy and free institutions demand. They can have
industrial sections, commercial sections and sections for every kind of housing from
low cost and multi-family to lots of more than an acre with very expensive homes.
Proper planning and governmental cooperation can prevent over-intensive and too
sudden development, insure against future suburban sprawl and slums and assure the
preservation of open space and local beauty. We do not intend that developing
municipalities shall be overwhelmed by voracious land speculators and developers if
they use the powers which they have intelligently and in the broad public interest.
Under our holdings today, they can be better communities for all than they previously
have been.
67 N.J. at 190-91, 336 A.2d at 733-34.
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CONCLUSION
The Mount Laurel decision opened a new era in exclusionary zoning
litigation by mandating that each developing municipality must provide
for its fair share of the regional housing needs. The court did not,
however, specify the criteria by which each municipality's fair share is
to be determined.
This Article has considered eight possible criteria for determining the
fair share allocation of every developing municipality. If exclusionary
zoning laws constitute the evil sought to be removed by the Mount
Laurel decision (rather than the national system of distribution of
resources that causes great disparities in ability to afford housing) then
the appropriate principle to be adopted by the courts would be the one
that declares invalid, as unreasonable, any zoning ordinance that fails to
reasonably provide for the housing needs of its own constituents. Such a
standard would be consistent with the principles of sound planning, the
limits of judicial power and the fundamental principle of democracy that
the power to make decisions of public policy must rest ultimately upon
the consent of those whose lives will be governed thereby.
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